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The particle physics community is sharing its resources over a Grid network. 
Currently resources are used on availability. But there is no fair allocation 
considering the importance or the private value of a job. Researchers are using 
Grid resources regardless of whether others need them more urgently. 
Furthermore, they do not even provide their own resources as they do not have an 
incentive for sharing them. Researchers are demanding a Grid infrastructure 
where an incentive mechanism is implemented. This will support a fair allocation 
of resources. Incentives can be provided by using money. But one constraint is 
that no real money should be involved for billing the resources in the science 
community. In this paper, a mechanism called Token Exchange System (TES) is 
proposed. Considering the requirements from the particle physics community this 
mechanism combines the advantages of reputation and payment mechanism in 
one coherent system to realize a fair allocation. It enables to build up a Grid 
infrastructure with an incentive mechanism which is scalable, incentive-
compatible and does not require a face-to-face agreement like the current system. 
 
Keywords:  Token Exchange System, incentive mechanism, Grid network 
 
1 Introduction 
In the e-Science community, Grid is an important infrastructure for the 
collaboration of scientific researchers to run calculations in a reasonable period of 
time. Combining distributed computing resources together and sharing these 
resources with others is demanded by research institutes. Especially researchers 
from particle physics are interested in sharing resources. They have a great 
resource demand for analyzing the data collected from the particle detector. The 
large amount of data comprising 4 million Gigabytes a year that is generated by 
the Large Hadron Collider experiment cannot be stored and processed by a single 
research institute (Berlich et al. 2005). Currently the GSI institute in Darmstadt, 
Germany, with its focus on particle and ionic physics produces about 1 Gigabyte 
data per second with its detectors. The various institutes take an interest in 
cooperative data analysis for saving precious time. Any institute can contribute his 
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 resources to the e-Science community and can in turn use the resources of others. 
The technical infrastructure allowing such coordinated resource sharing is 
provided by the Grid environment so as to realize an e-Collaboration among the 
researchers.  
This resource sharing approach, however, is problematic due to free-riding as 
known from Peer-to-Peer coupled with the prevailing competition in the research 
field (Adar, Huberman 2000). It turns out that even in Academia researchers are 
quite not willing to share resources or knowledge with other institutes without 
reciprocity. Furthermore, in the particle physics the resources are not utilized 
efficiently. Users tend to send too many jobs on others’ computing nodes. To 
avoid overconsumption, the sharing of resources has to be compensated to enable 
a fair transaction, which is not trivial in this context. This is not a “tragedy of the 
commons” problem (Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990), since the resources belong to 
institutes or research projects, who are the owner. The need for more resources 
from other institutes is due to analysis of the large amount of data.   
In industry, compensation for shared resources is typically made by transferring 
money. Money is used to pay the counterpart a compensation for having access to 
the resources like applications (Application Service Providing), information or 
services. In principle, this payment system is also applicable to the scientific 
communities. However, the community faces major problems by implementing 
this system: researchers deny the usage of money for sharing resources for two 
main reasons. Firstly, researchers are not allowed to spend money without 
presenting valid reasons for their expenses to the sponsor. They always take care 
of the investment they make. An investment can lead to revenue. In some 
countries it is prohibited by law for institutes to make profit (e.g. Germany). 
Secondly, it is regarded unethical that those institutes with a deeper pocket are in a 
position to do better research than others. Thus, it is not surprising that researchers 
tend to prefer reputation mechanisms rather than money as incentive mechanisms. 
In reputation mechanisms the researchers do not rate the value of resources, but 
the behavior of the user. A disadvantage of reputation mechanism is the lack of 
incentive for motivating researchers to offer scarce resources. The participants do 
only the bare minimum to retain an acceptable reputation level that allows 
participating in the exchange process without restrictions. This means that there is 
no clear incentive to share scarce resources (i.e. high computational power).  
The main contribution of this paper is to give an overview of the requirements of a 
mechanism in the scientific community, compare former research work regarding 
the requirements and present a tailored mechanism for the e-Science Grid 
community. The incentive mechanism we propose is called Token Exchange 
System (TES). TES promises to achieve sharing resources in e-Science without 
money while retaining the beneficial coordination effect of money. TES is based 
on a reputation mechanism and a payment mechanism merged into one system. 
We use tokens instead of money for compensation. These tokens have a certain 
value. In contrast to real money or e-Cash, the tokens can be issued and 
distributed by the participants themselves. The value of the tokens is derived from 
the reputation of a participant and the number of issued tokens. Several 
restrictions are realized through a function calculating the token value to restrain 
flooding the whole system with their own tokens to manipulate the system. This 
approach is novel, as it combines existing payment and reputation mechanism into 
one coherent system. This way, transaction between institutes can be 
accomplished without burdening their financial endowment.  
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 This paper is structured as follows: in section 2 requirements and the related work 
will be outlined. The model of TES is described in section 3 and the simulation 
results are shown in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 System analysis 
In a Grid network agents can have different behavioral characteristics. They can 
be altruistic, selfish or malicious (Yu, Singh 2003). These characteristics are not 
fixed per se. The agents can change the way they behave. For instance, Liebau et 
al (2005) define a normal agent who behaves selfishly, but to a certain extent 
altruistic. This type of agent only shares a few files for a certain period of time.  
One goal in a network with different agents is to maximize the overall welfare to 
enhance trust in the network. The good agents expect to be treated fairly, if 
resources are allocated in the Grid. Otherwise, they will not participate in the 
network any longer (in the long run). The idea behind TES is to provide a new 
incentive which cannot be fulfilled by current payment and reputation 
mechanisms. This will make the agent behave more cooperative and lead to an 
enhanced overall outcome. The incentive is set by combining both mechanisms 
into one coherent system. The payment mechanism is used to evaluate a 
commodity (goods or services). The reputation mechanism is necessary to 
evaluate the behavior of a user in a network. In TES the reputation has an impact 
on the budget of the users. 
 
2.1 Requirements  
The Grid usage for particle physics is one example from a variety of possible 
scenarios. Although TES is not limited to the application in particle physics Grid, 
we use it as a sample scenario. Different scenarios are defined by different 
requirements. The requirements describe the upcoming issues for exchanging 
resources in Grid. The most important requirement is the absence of real money in 
the Grid (requirement 1). In scientific environment the Grid computing resources 
are financed by research projects. These projects are led and controlled by 
national governments. One restriction by the national governments is not to earn 
money with the government-funded resources. Implementation of a non-monetary 
system is, therefore, essential. Instead of money, tokens are used which have other 
properties.  
Another property is to provide a compensation payment (requirement 2). Grid 
resources have to be consumed immediately. A reservation without consumption 
is a loss for the provider and other consumers who are waiting to complete their 
jobs. Without a payment mechanism (neither real money nor tokens), the provider 
will not receive compensation. As real money is not applicable, tokens can be 
used for paying compensation to the provider.  
Tokens as a payment mechanism can give agents an incentive to share their 
scarce resources with others (requirement 3). The particle physics Grid has 
several institutes in its projects. They have to share their resources with other 
project members, which is not always done consistently. An economic incentive 
can elicit the researcher or his institute to contribute high computational power or 
machines with specific configuration for certain jobs. These incentives have to be 
set by the economic model based on the token payment system. The model must  
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 be designed in such a way that it enforces the participants to behave in a fair 
manner.  
Enforcements are implemented on both at the technical and at economical level. 
The implementation at both levels has to be complementary. The goal of 
enforcements is to achieve fairness and robustness for the participants using the 
accounting system (requirement 4). An exchange in the Grid is fair, if the 
requester gets the desired service and the provider receives adequate payment for 
the service. In case even if one of the rules is not obeyed, the accounting system 
has to be robust enough to identify the failure and punish the offending party 
(Dasgupta 2000; Papaioannou, Stamoulis 2005).  
A Grid network must be capable of accommodating the expanding number of 
users. Scalability is, therefore, necessary for technical and volume throughput 
expansion (requirement 5). A scalable economic model can be implemented into a 
technically well-defined system to guarantee a compound dynamic and flexible 
system as emphasized by Forster (Foster et al. 2006).  
 
2.2 Related work 
In TES, every agent has his own tokens. For scalability reasons, the underlying 
technical infrastructure is supposed to be a decentralized network as known from 
P2P.  There has been a lot of research work done on implementing payment 
mechanisms for P2P and Grid systems (Barmouta, Buyya 2003; Dutta et al. 2003; 
Irwin et al. 2005). One example is Karma (Vishnumurthy, Chandrakumar, Sirer 
2003). Karma uses a uniform currency called Karma for payment. Every user in 
the network can earn and pay with Karma. The problem is the inflation and 
deflation of the currency. Furthermore, a reputation mechanism is not considered 
in Karma. 
A potential combination of payment and reputation was used in PeerTrust system 
(Xiong, Liu 2004). They introduced a Transaction Context Factor in their 
reputation mechanism to give a big transaction more weight than a small 
transaction. The aim is to avoid malicious attacks, where small transactions are 
done truthfully and fairly for building up a reputation and then to be dishonest on 
a big transaction to earn more profit while not substantially decreasing their own 
reputation. Hence, the amount of a transaction has an impact on the reputation. 
But the reputation has no impact on the user’s budget. 
Liebau et al. (2004) propose a mechanism called Token-based Accounting System 
(TbAS) for P2P systems. Tokens serve as a receipt for a transaction between two 
peers. The peer who receives a file hands over a token to the file provider. The 
provider exchanges the received token into one of his own. The exchange of the 
token is done via a public aggregation function, which is not defined. Moreover, a 
reputation mechanism is not integrated in the accounting system. In TbAS the 
token itself does not have a value. They assume that one token is fixed to a trading 
parameter like one token for one Megabyte or for one minute of service. Thus, the 
“price” will not vary for one Megabyte, i.e. depending on quality of service or 
reputation of provider. 
The solution to avoid double-spending in TbAS is done by using a serial number 
for each token. However, the double-spending check is done after the transaction. 
The problem here is that once the tokens have been exchanged and the reputation 
evaluated, there is no possibility for the provider to revoke the process or to get 
compensation. In TES the check is always done during the transaction before the 
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 services are exchanged. There is no way that once spent tokens can be re-offered 
and distributed successfully. 
Moreton and Twigg (2003) presented a token-based protocol, where the token has 
a value and it has an impact on the exchange of resources and payment. The 
reputation is represented by the token-value. However, they did not examine how 
their calculation of the token value can set incentives for behaving truthfully. The 
calculation function is a one way track. Once the peer behaves badly and gets a 
bad evaluation, he cannot “clean” his reputation again. On one side it sounds as a 
good incentive to behave well. On the other side, if it is an attack where several 
peers rate him incorrectly, he has no chance to show his true face later on.  
 
3 The model 
In TbAS, each agent in the network is assigned to a group of trusted peers (Liebau 
et al. 2004). The tokens are issued by the trusted peers who are assumed to be 
trustworthy. These trusted peers manage the accounting information of the agent. 
An agent has a certain number of tokens. To consume resources, the agent has to 
send a request for the emission of the tokens for payment. The trusted peers check 
the amount of available tokens with the amount of requested tokens to avoid 
unauthorized token distribution and emit the tokens to the agent. With the 
received tokens the agent can consume resources from other agents. For every 
utilized service he has to hand over tokens to the service provider. The service 
provider redeems the tokens at his trusted peers. This will raise his “budget”. The 
foreign tokens from the consumer agent will be changed into the tokens of the 
service provider. The exchange rate is a publicly available function. The provider 
can use his earned tokens to acquire resources for himself. 
 
3.1 Exchanging the tokens in TES 
The function for calculating the exchange rate was not defined by Liebau et al. 
From the economic perspective, this is essential for an incentive-based resource 
exchange. Tokens can be changed at a predefined ratio, for instance 1:1. In our 
approach, the exchange rate is not based on a public function. Every price offer 
from the provider side is based on the number of offered tokens and is open to 
bargain. For instance, a provider can ask 5 tokens for 1 CPU hour. The requester 
can offer only 4 tokens as payment.  
The aim of TES is to set an incentive for an unselfish and a non-malicious 
behavior. Tokens are deployed to be used as a payment system. The participants 
in a network can pay another participant with the tokens. One characteristic of 
these tokens is individuality. Every participant has his own tokens, which can be 
created and distributed by himself. The agent is the token issuer. For instance, 
user A wants to receive a Grid service from user B. A offers his tokens to B. If B 
accepts the offer he will be “paid” in A’s Tokens. B as the owner of a certain 
number of tokens from A can decide whether he wants to redeem these tokens at 
A or to offer them to another participant C. After several transactions a 
participants possesses tokens from different users. The incentive of possessing 
others’ tokens is to increase the liquidity. Every token from agent A has a token 
value vA which can change over time. The token value is influenced by the 
reputation. A bad behavior of A has an impact on his token value. If B has tokens 
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 from A, the value of these tokens will decrease and therefore his budget will 
decrease, too. In future, B will think twice about accepting tokens belonging to A. 
In the long run the tokens of users with a bad token value (and thus a bad 
reputation) will not be accepted widely. The bad users can still earn money by 
providing services. However, their token value is further an indicator of their 
reputation. Thus, a service provider with a bad reputation has an issue with 
canvassing customers. Both ways he has to increase his token value by behaving 
well. Three constraints have to be considered in providing this token system. 
Axiom 1:  Since everybody has his own tokens, these tokens have to be 
limited in number (Moreton, Twigg 2003). Otherwise the users can 
mint their tokens arbitrarily and have infinite money (like minting 
your own Cent-Coins). 
Axiom 2:   The reputation has an impact on the token value. An incentive for 
emitting tokens is necessary. Otherwise the agents will not 
distribute their tokens and their token value will not have an effect 
on others’ budget. 
Axiom 3:  The number of distributed tokens has to be bounded (Axiom 1). 
However, a hard constraint will make it less flexible for the user. 
Any agent should be able to obtain a credit for an emergency. In 
this case, the agent has to pay some kind of interest. 
 
3.2 Calculating the token value 
The determination of the token value has to consider these axioms. To fulfill these 
axioms the token value function vx of an agent X is calculated as follows 




−−−=  (1) 
 
with vx ∈ [0, …, ub0 - ncrx], mx ∈ IN0. ub0 is the upper bound value which has to 
be determined for a system. The influence of the reputation value on the token 
value is expressed by the non-credibility rate ncrx with 0 as the best reputation 
value (similar to Papaioannou, Stamoulis 2005). The higher the value of ncrx the 
worse is the reputation. The calculation of the reputation value is only an example. 
Other reputation mechanisms can be included by calculating the ncrx value. For 
instance, by including a reputation mechanism with a valuation repx ∈ [0, 1] the 
function does not need an upper bound, as it is limited by the reputation value: 




−−=  (2) 
 
In this paper we will consider the first function (1). Every distributed token has 
the current value vx which is adjusted dynamically based on the two variables mx 
and ncrx. The number of distributed tokens mx is necessary to define the liquidity 
of an agent X. By spending his own tokens (increasing mx), the agent has less 
tokens for further transaction. He can earn foreign tokens or wait until others 
redeem his tokens to increase his budget. But the distribution of his tokens will 
raise his token value until a predefined maximum m* is reached. 
Furthermore, with the three parameters j, k and l the value function can be 
adjusted regarding the initial token value for mx = 0, the maximum token value m* 
and the gradient of the decrease of the token value (Figure 1). The gradient is 
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crucial to determine how hard an agent is punished when distributing more than 
m* tokens. The option to provide more tokens than the maximum reflects 
axiom 3. The agent can provide more tokens, but he has to take his reputation loss 
into account (as payment of interest).  
The token value cannot be increased infinitely by distributing unlimited number of 
tokens (axiom 1). The limitation of the distributed tokens is not a hard constraint, 
but it reduces the reputation and the acceptance of the tokens and the transaction 
with a negatively rated agent will decrease: 







The fulfillment of axiom 2 is presented under the terms of a simple utility function 
of ux(vx) = vx. For mx,1, mx,2 ∈ [0, …, m*] with mx,1 < mx,2 the token value is as 
follows: vx(mx,1, ncrx) <  vx(mx,2, ncrx). The agent X is always better off by 
increasing his token value until mx = m*.   
Figure 1 illustrates how the axioms are fulfilled by the token value function. 
 
 Figure 1: Token value function 
 
4 Evaluation 
4.1 Simulation setup 
In this simulation we want to show the effect of reputation on the budget of the 
agents. There are two types of agents we name Pastors and Mavericks. An agent’s 
behavior can be good (providing full service or transferring payment) or bad 
(providing bad service or not transferring payment). As an agent will not always 
behave well or badly, a probability parameter decides how well or badly an agent 
might act. Thus, the Pastors might behave well with a probability of 90% and a 
Maverick might behave well with a probability of 10%. All agents of one type are 
symmetric. Different agents do not have different utility functions. 
The parameters are defined as follows: ub0 = 1000; ncrx = 0; j = 0.05; k = 70; 
l = 110. The reputation mechanism is based on the credibility mechanism 
(Papaioannou, Stamoulis 2005). However, the punishment is not implemented 
since any utility function and learning algorithms are not considered yet. The 
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 reputation mechanism is based on an asymmetric approach, where a bad rating 
increases the ncr-value by 10 and a good rating decrease the ncr-value by 2 with 0 
as the best value and with no upper bound value. 
For the transaction in each case two randomly selected agents will be allocated 
together (25 allocations for 50 agents in one round). After the allocation the 
transaction begins and is divided into 4 phases. In phase 1 it has to be decided, if 
the agent behaves well or badly based on the probability. The second phase is 
about how the buyer and the seller are thinking about the reputation of the 
counterpart and if they want to settle a transaction with the partner. Pastors will 
not deal with agents who have a token value below a threshold of v0(·) = 500. In 
Phase 3 the offered price and the payment will be determined. The process of 
finding the right tokens (token selection process) is divided into three subsections. 
The succeeding subsection is only executed, if the preceding subsection was not 
successful: 
1. At first, the buyer tries to maximize his own reputation. Thus, he 
scrutinizes, whether he can distribute his tokens without decreasing his 
reputation. 
2. If he cannot distribute his own tokens (mx = m*), he will check, if he 
possesses enough tokens from the seller. 
3. In case he does not have any tokens from the seller, he tries to offer tokens 
from other agents. 
After this token selection process there can be an offer (in case there are enough 
tokens for payment) or an offer is not possible due to lack of enough tokens and 
the token value respectively. The price of an offer will be calculated by summing 
up the current token value of each token. Now the provider can decide whether he 
accepts the offer or not. The price varies randomly between 0 and 10,000. In 
Phase 4 the transfer of the tokens and the evaluation of the provider and consumer 
are settled. A well behaving agent will be rated well whereas a bad agent will be 
rated poorly. The underlying assumption is that the agent will rate each other 
truthfully and there are no opportunistic or false ratings.  
 
4.2 Simulation scenarios and results 
We analyzed two scenarios for a better understanding of the effects of reputation 
on the budget. In the first scenario the Mavericks did not take their individual 
token value into account whereas it was considered in the second scenario. If their 
token value falls below the threshold value v0(·), the Mavericks will change their 
strategy and behave well until their token value is over the threshold value again. 
The results are compared to the combination of a payment and a reputation 
mechanism. The identical reputation mechanism was implemented in both 
systems. In the payment system the agents have an initial budget of 41488 
currency units. For comparison, this value is derived from the area below the 







=∂−−=∂ ∫∫= xxmxm xx mmemmv x  (3) 
 
The simulation was run over 20 generations with each 5000 rounds for the two 
scenarios. Nevertheless, in the figures only the relevant first 1000 rounds are 
visible. In the simple scenario the Mavericks do not care about their own 
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 reputation. The budget of the Pastors and Mavericks was used as a metric to 
compare both systems. As illustrated in Figure 2 the Mavericks earn a lot of 
tokens at the beginning where the Pastors trust the Mavericks. After 100 rounds 
there are no more transactions between the two groups, because the reputation of 
the Mavericks is below a predefined threshold value. The Pastors do not trust the 
Mavericks. But Pastors still trust other Pastors. The Mavericks do not have the 
chance to trust Pastors, because there is no transaction due to their token value. In 
the monetary system, liquidity of the Mavericks is not decreasing whereas in TES 
the Mavericks can still “lose money”. This is the major incentive not to behave 
selfishly in TES. In the first scenario, the Mavericks only have a small loss, 
because their tokens are distributed among all agents. We assumed the worst case, 
where the Mavericks wait to behave selfishly until 90% of their tokens are 
emitted. It has to be considered that not all tokens of the Mavericks are distributed 
to Pastors. The Mavericks do not identify who the Pastors are. Thus, Mavericks 
can earn the tokens of Mavericks as well. After 450 rounds the reputation of the 
Mavericks cannot get worse anymore. Thus, the budget of each group in TES 
remains almost stable. Because the Mavericks behave well and the Pastors behave 
poorly with a probability of 10%, the reputation affects the budget marginally. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2: Simulation results for payment mechanism (a) and TES (b) in 
scenario one (average budget of an agent)
 
If the Mavericks are concerned about their reputation as in the second scenario, 
the difference between both systems is even more significant (Figure 3). Even 
though the Mavericks can gain nearly all the money in the system with time, in 
TES their budget is worse than the budget of the Pastors. In the first case they 
behave well to gain more money from others, if their reputation is below the 
threshold value. In TES, the Pastors can recover from the selfishness of the 
Mavericks and regain their budget. The reason is a constraint of the acceptance of 
the tokens. A Pastor who already has a good token value does not accept tokens 
with a low token value. Thus, in a transaction between two agents of each group 
the Maverick will accept the low valued token for payment and pay with high 
valued tokens, because they need resources. They have no alternative. In the long 
run the budget of the Mavericks will get even worse, since they only receive the 
worse tokens. The Mavericks are forced to behave well over a long period of time. 
In this simple simulation setup, we could present that the Mavericks in TES 
perform worse in both scenarios than in a common payment system.  
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 (a) (b) 
Figure 3: Simulation results for payment mechanism (a) and TES (b) in 
scenario two (average budget of an agent)
 
5 Conclusion 
In our approach, the tokens represent the reputation value and the liquidity of an 
agent. A payment is done by exchanging tokens. As everybody has his individual 
tokens, his reputation has a direct effect on the token value and thus the liquidity. 
With a better performance and a good evaluation of others on his service and 
payment the agent can increase his reputation. 
TES enables a resource exchange in scientific Grids. Tokens are used for 
payments and do not represent real money (requirement 1). The payment via 
tokens allows the agents to pay compensation (requirement 2), if the resource of 
the provider was not utilized or misused by the consumer. Furthermore, TES 
provides an incentive to share scarce resources as the provider can earn more 
tokens, if he offers the resources that are in greater demand (requirement 3). From 
the economic perspective, the price for the resource (here the number of tokens 
with a high value offered) will rise. Fairness and robustness have to be considered 
in the reputation mechanism. An appropriate mechanism has to be chosen, which 
affords a fair evaluation of the agent’s reputation and an attack-resistant reputation 
system (requirement 4). Moreover, the scalability is given by the economically 
decentralized token system. A P2P-System like TbAS is a complementary 
technically decentralized system (requirement 5). 
The simulation proved that TES has a better performance than a common payment 
system combined with a reputation mechanism. Up to now in the simulation the 
payment in TES does not offer a combination of tokens from different agents 
within one transaction. This will lead to more transactions in a round. A 
sensitivity analysis with the initial settings of the parameters is required to adapt 
the function to different scenarios. Additionally, untruthful feedback of lying 
agents can worsen the system. 
Another aspect is to introduce an expiration date for the tokens.  Firstly, this will 
prevent the hoarding of tokens by one user as the tokens will get invalid. 
Secondly, if agents join and leave the network the tokens should be taken out of 
the system to avoid inflation. An expiration date will automate this process. 
All in all, TES is an approach to set an incentive for good behavior and 
cooperation the scientific Grid network. Our token based system is tailored to the 
needs of the scientific community and is thus a promising starting point to 
overcome incentive problems in e-Science. 
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